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CoMMENTS

NEw TRIAL - UsE OF TESTIMONY OF JuRoRs TO SET AsmE
VERDICT-Whether or not testimony of a juror is admissible for the
purpose of setting aside a verdict is a question upon which the cases are
in conflict. Much of the contrariety of opinion is due to a failure of courts
to distinguish between the two basic factual situations which present the
problem. The juror's testimony may be sought to be introduced to
show either: (I) that, due to some misunderstanding, his own thought
processes were misdirected in arriving at his final vote; or, (2) that he
observed the open misconduct of a fellow juror. At the outset it should
be noted that the majority rule is to exclude all testimony of jurors
whether it goes to prove misunderstanding or misconduct. However,
the American Law Institute in its Model Code of Evidence adopted a·
rule 1 correctly recognizing the distinction pointed out and squarely
opposing the majority rule as to misconduct. It stated that "every member
of the jury may testify to any material matter, including any statement
or conduct ... of any member of the jury ... whether during deliberations
of the jury, or in reaching or reporting its verdict...." Because of the
number of eminent authorities who aided in this draft it is appropriate
to reconsider the policies lying behind the majority rule.

I
Testimony by a juror relating to his own thought processes in reach-

1

American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence, Rule

301.
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ing a verdict has been excluded by the courts with near unanimity. 2 In
Wright v. I. & M. Telegraph Co. 8 it is stated th~t an "affidavit to avoid
the verdict may not be received to show aµy matter which does essentially
inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not assent to the verdict;
that he misunderstood the instructions of the court, the statements of
the witness, or the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly influenced
by the statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors, or mistaken in his
calculation or judgment, or other matter resting alone in the juror's
breast." 4 It is noteworthy that such a rule in no way excludes testimony
as to activity but only the effect of such activity upon the juror's mind.
Of course, if the juror's claim is true, this rule of exclusion will work
extreme hardship upon the losing litigant, for his opponent has recovered
a judgment in spite of failing to satisfy the entire jury. However, courts
realize that truth cannot be assured by admission of such testimony
because the falsity of the testimony and affidavits. by the juror could
seldom be established. A dishonest juror, or one who has forgotten bits
of evidence which were clear to him in the jury room, could assert that
he misunderstood certain instructions. How can this asserted state of
mind be disproved?
Turning to extrinsic considerations of policy, courts have refused
the testimony on three grounds: (a) that there would be no certainty
in a verdict,5 for the unscrupulous or forgetful juror could overthrow
the deliberations of the twelve; (b) that there would be no end to
trials; 6 and ( c) that it would violate the parol evidence rule. The latter
argument is advanced by Professor Wigmore 7 and by a few cases 8 contending that a written verdict is the final culmination ap.d integration
of the prior thoughts of the jury and cannot be disturbed by advancing
those prior thoughts.
It is sµbmitted that the rule excluding juror's testimony relating to
matters "which inhere in the verdict itself" is sound and is necessary to
assure a stable legal system. A verdict and judgment must mean more
than a temporary victory which may be snatched away at the caprice of
a recalcitrant juror, or parties engaged in a dispute will turn to self-help
2
Due to a·misapplication of Wright v. I. & M. Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195 {1866),
discussed, infra, the Iowa Supreme Court has allowed affidavits to show that the jurors
gave weight to certain inadmissible evidence. Douglass v. Agne, 125 Iowa 67, 99 N.W.
550 (1904),andBrownLandCo.v.Lehman, 134Iowa712, u2N.W. 185 (1907).
8
20 Iowa 195 {1866).
4
Id. at 210.
5
Robbins v. Windover, 2 Tyl. (Vt.) II at 13 (1802).
6
Hudson v. State, 9 Yerg. (17 Tenn.) 407 at 410 (1836).
7
8 WxcMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed.,§ 2348 (1940).
8
For example, see: Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board, 5 H.L. 418 {1872);
Murdoch v. Sumner, 22 Pick. (39 Mass.) 156 (1839).
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and to breaches of the peace rather than seeking the aid of a judicial
tribunal.

II
There remains the more controversial subject of admissibility of
testimony by a juror concerning misconduct which he has witnessed. It
is necessary that certain formalities be observed during retirement of
the jury. It is true that formalities are only indicia of the existence of
good reasoning, but they are insisted upon in the case of jury deliberations because of the impossibility of introducing the actual motives of the
jurors which were the bases of the verdict. This discussion assumes the
existence of an irregularity which will avoid the verdict under local law;
the inquiry is instead: Can the irregularity be shown by testimony of the
,jurors themselves? The majority of courts have decided it cannot be.
If this misconduct consists of an expression of one of the jurors and
the testimony is offered by another juror, then it must fi.r~t be determined
if the juror who expressed his views can claim the communication to be
privileged. In the case of a general communication by a juror to his
fellow jurors, it has been conceded that his statements cannot be disclosed
without his consent,9 for all of Wigmore's elements of privilege are
present: it originates in confidence; the confidence is necessary to maintain a semblance of independent jury trial; more injury would result in
denying the privilege, for no juror should be afraid to speak his mind
during deliberations; and, that fair jury trials should be fostered cannot
be questioned in lig.b,t of the express words of the constitutions.10 However, when the words spoken involve misconduct, the privilege is not
allowed to protect the speaker and indirectly to injure the litigant, for
then the confidence is not necessary to maintain a fair trial and the injury
is greater if the testimony is excluded. 11 ' Otherwise testimony of threats,
promises, and illegal agreements in the jury room would be inadmissible
because of the doctrine of privilege.
Is there any other basis on which to exclude testimony of a juror
regarding misconduct which he claims to have witnessed? This problem
was presented in Vaise v. Delaval 12 in which the jurors' affidavits averred
that the decision was based upon chance. Prior to this case (1785) there
was little doubt but that the affidavits were admissible. 18 Lord Mansfield
9

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2346 (1940); State v. Morrow, 158 Ore.
412, 75 P. (2d) 737 (1938).
10
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d. ed.,§ 2285 (1940).
11
8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,§ 2346 (1940); Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532,
158 S. 89 (1934); 97 A.L.R. rn38 (1935). Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53
S.Ct. 465 (1933), recognizes that privilege does not apply to misconduct.
12
I T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
18
Phillips v. Fowler, Barnes 441, 94 Eng. Rep. 994 (1735); Aylett v. Jewel,
2 Black. W. 1299, 96 Eng. Rep. 761 (1779).
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ignored precedents, however, and excluded such testimony because "such
· conduct is a very high misdemeanor," and stated further that "in every
such case the court must derive their knowledge from some other source
such as some person having seen the transaction through a window or by
some such means." It seemed that this decision was doomed to be shortlived because it was squarely contrary to earlier cases and was far from
well-reasoned, but because the prestige of Mansfield was ascribed to the
case it became the settled law of England and was accepted without
question in a majority of states in this country.
What reason can be advanced for a rule which excludes testimony of
a juror as to acts of misconduct? Lord Mansfield's statement, that the
acts were a "very high misdemeanor," rested on an old Latin phrase:
nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur-no man shall be heard to
allege his own turpitude. This principle flourished in the I 7oo's and was
a favorite of Mansfield.14 However, it died a quick death in the I 8oo's
when judicial attacks similar to those of Judge Livingston were levelled
at it: "Are not criminals in England every day convicted and even executed on their own confessions? And is not our own State prison filled in
the same way?" 15 The doctrine has now been discredited both in United
States and in England.
Retention of the rule excluding jurors' testimony, after the doctrine
upon which it rested had been abandoned, required the courts to seek a
new basis for that rule.
The uncertainty of verdicts and indeterminacy of trials, the foundations for excluding a juror's testimony relating to his mental processes,
fail to uphold exclusion of testimony of misconduct. Here we have an
overt act by one juror which can impress the senses of eleven others in
the room. Those eleven can deny the alleged misconduct if it did not
occur.
Owen v. Warburton 16 advanced a further argument that a juror who
believed the result would be against his views might propose that the
verdict be determined by lot, and then when returned against his opinion
could have it set aside by his own affidavit. This may be true, but the
same juror could simply refuse to vote with the eleven and in the same
way secure a new trial. Wigmore dismisses Owen v. Warburton as a
"fantastic imagination" and points out that on the same logic we should
14
In Walton v. Shelly, l T.R. 296, 99 Eng. Rep. II04 (1786), Mansfield
refused to allow an indorser of a note to plead usury, saying at p. 300, ~'no party who
has signed a paper or a deed shall ever be permitted to give testimony to invalidate
that instrument, •••" Again in Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257
(1777), he applied the same doctrine to prevent one spouse from testifying to the
nonaccess of the other and thereby bastardized the chil~.
15
Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Caines (N.Y.) 57 at 59 (1805).
16
1 B. & P. N.R. 326, 127 Eng. Rep. 489 (1805).
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abolish all appeals "because a wicked judge might give a wrong reason
against a party whom he favored, so that there may be a new trial." 11
Still other judges exclude the testimony of misconduct because the
defeated party may harass and beset jurors for testimony of irregularities,18 or on the grounds that it amounts to entrapping jurors into confessing criminal liability.19 But why should the court protect one who has
committed a crime, at the expense of an innocent litigant? When a thief
or embezzler confesses, the court does not close its ears because the
confession was obtained from the one by whom the money was stolen.
As for the harassing, it would seem that this disadvantage is more than
offset by the truth it may evoke.
Vaise v. Delaval, mentioned above, distinguished sharply between
the testimony of a juror and that of an outsider. A bailiff who invades
the secrecy of the jury room is guilty of reprehensible conduct; yet some
courts allow him to testify as to irregularities occurring therein. 20 An
interloper outside the window could testify in these courts concerning
discovered misconduct. It is singular that the courts then refuse to admit
the best evidence of that irregularity-testimony of the jurors, themselves. There is no reason to require formalities and then refuse to listen
to evidence of their breach. Courts find comfort in repeating their
shibboleth-"a juror cannot impeach his verdict" 21-and believe that
justice has been done, not looking to see what type of case they have
before them.
The obscurity which surrounds this subject is a direct result of Vaise
v. Delaval, a case which was not only poorly reasoned, but one for which
even that poor reason no longer exists. Despite this, many legislatures
have enacted statutes which affirm this view, failing to draw any distinction as to subject matter of the testimony. 22 It is submitted that courtswith the aid of the legislature if necessary-should distinguish acts of
misconduct from matters lying in the juror's breast and admit testimony
regarding misconduct.
A handful of states has drawn such a distinction, steering clear of the
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2353 at p. 686 (1940).
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 at 267, 35 S.Ct. 783 (1915).
19
Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn (Pa.) 150 (1811).
20
Wright v. Abbot, 160 Mass. 395, 36 N.E. 62 (1894), and Reich v. Thompson,
346 Mo. 577, 142 S.W. (2d) 486 (1940), allow the testimony of a person other than
a jury-man to impeach a verdict. Contra: Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Holmes, 223 Ala.
188, 134 S. 875 (1931); Lambert v. Caronna, 206 N.C. 616, 175 S.E. 303 (1934);
Bourrev. Texas Co., 51 R.I. 254, 154A. 82 (1931). See 129A.L.R. 803 (1940).
21
There is such blind allegiance to the shibboleth that some courts allow affidavits
to support a verdict even if it finds that support only within the juror's breast. See Fulton
County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 16 S.E. 260 (1892), and cases cited in 93 A.L.R. 1449
(1934). As to the right to poll a jury on these matters, see 86 A.L.R. 203 (1933).
22
See for example, Mich. Comp. Laws ( I 929) § 14292.
17
18
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entrapment created by Lord Mansfield. New York early discredited
Vaise v. Delaval, Judge-Livingston saying, "Why the judges are so
very tender of the jury; or why they, as well as others, may not be
punished by their own confession, which is the highest evidence, we are
not told .... The case of Vaise v. Delaval, happened since the revolution,
and therefore forms no precedent." 23 Later New York cases overlooked
these strong words, however, and fell in line with the majority. 24
Tennessee was next to adopt a rule admitting testimony of misconduct,25 and it has not deviated from this view. 26 Perhaps the minority
rule should therefore be called the Tennessee rule, but the first decision
to be widely noted wasthelowadecisionof Wrightv.I. & M. Telegraph
Co.,21 ably written by Judge Cole. It is from this jurisdiction that the
minority rule derived its name. The case holds that testimony is inadmissible as to those matters inhering in the verdict, but that "affidavits of
jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any
matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not
essentially inhere in the verdict itself...." 28 This same distinction has
been recognized in seven state courts 29 and may soon be the rule in the
federal courts.80

III
It is submitted th~t the Iowa rule is more consistent with principles
of justice. Courts are founded for the purpose of preventing or rectifying injuries resulting from unlawful acts. Because the wrongdoer
happens to be a juror and the one injured a party litigant does not change
that function. Granting that sound policy dictates that a verdict by a
28 Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Caines (N.Y.) 57 at 60 (1805).

,.

24
Dana v. Tucker, 4 John. (N.Y.) 487 (1809); Atikian v. Chang Wen Tai, 153
Misc. 881,276 N.Y.S. 228 (1934).
25 Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. (10Tenn.) 60 (1821).
26 The affidavits admitted in Crawford v. State, supra, actually went to the beliefs
of the jurors. On this point it was repudiated 15 years later in Hudson v. State, 9
Yerg. (17 Tenn.) 407 (1836). For the law in Tennessee today, see: Texas Co. v.
Ingram, 16 Tenn. App. 267, 64 S.W. (2d) 208 (1933).
21
20 Iowa 195 (1866).
28 Id. at 210.
29
Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 S. 89 (1934); Wright v. I. & M. Telegraph
Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); De Porte v. State
Furniture Co., 129 Neb. 282, 261 N.W. 419 (1935); James Turner & Sons v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489 (1937); Texas Co. v. Ingram; 16
Tenn. App. 267, 64 S.W. (2d) 208 (1933); Stallworth v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. Rep.
255, 186.S.W. (2d) 252 (1945).
.
80
See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50 (1892), following the
rule of Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874), admitting the testimony. In McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783 (1915), however, the Court excluded testimony
of a juror that the verdict was a quotient verdict. Note the opinion of Judge Hand in
Jorgensen v. York Ice Machinery Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 160 F. (2d) 432 at 435.
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jury which has followed the procedural requirements should remain
untouched by matters lying within the juror's breast, there is no reason
to protect it when that juror overtly breaches his duty in returning the
verdict. The consecrated rubric of the majority is no better explained
away than by Judge Brewer: "Public policy forbids that a matter
resting in the personal consciousness of one juror should be received to
overthrow the verdict, because being personal it is not accessible to other
testimony.... But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of
all the jurors; if one affirms misconduct the remaining eleven can deny;
one cannot disturb the action of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with
one for the eleven may be heard." 81
Since the provision of Model Code of Evidence dealing with this
situation is nothing more than a statement of this minority rule it is
inescapable that it has stated a proposition much sounder than that
which the majority of courts follow today. Perhaps the eminence of
the authority supporting the Model Code will hasten the acceptance of
its principles by statutes and judicial decisions.

R. J. Nordstrom, S.Ed.
81

Perry v. Bailey,

12

Kan. 539 at 545 (1874).

